“Unfinished” Secularization meets tradition
hierarchies of values in Russia, Indonesia & India

Stephen C. Headley (version 15 March 2013)

“Il n’existe au monde qu’un seul litige, celui de savoir si c’est le tout ou le particulier qui prédomine. » (F. Hölderlin, Oeuvres, Pléiades, Gallimard 1967 : 996) In his Essais de Sociologie (1983), Louis Dumont gives this question a profound sociological turn through his analysis of the rise of “pseudo-holisms” in the context of fascism and communism. Thirty years later, extreme economic changes and globalization have further eroded local customs and unfinished secularization has multiplied the appearance of pseudo-holisms.

What role can this concept play in comparative studies of secularization? Case by case comparisons are very time consuming but provide solid empirical data on which to enlarge this theoretical concept. This paper is a methodological proposition with only two examples.

1) An overview of secularization processes

At the beginning of the twentieth century, structural societal differentiation at work in non-European countries was driven by the increasingly contested hegemony and homogenizing potential of modernity. The pretensions of the earlier cosmologically-ordered social regimes were gradually being replaced by an ethic of autonomous agency. “Modern” authenticity began replacing the fetters of “tradition”, but at the end of the twentieth century it was clear that this individualism has not fully displaced early collective representations. Unfinished secularization left societies hanging; juxtaposed cosmologies provided little belonging and less transcendence. It became clear that any partial acceptance of modernity¹ led to continual redefining and reconstructions of cultural and political programs. This breakdown of traditional legitimacies led to the appearance of fundamentalism, and reinventions of damaged, endangered traditions. Ethnic cleansing and other forms of protest appeared in these artificial efforts to revive or reconstruct threatened or new social centers and pivots on the basis of an earlier consensus.

The internal antinomies of such hybrid cultural communities animated by critical political discourses inhibited multiple cosmologies from creating pluralism where a common good could emerge². Unfinished secularization lays bare the ambiguous place of “the Good” in the articulation of a social morphology. The incoherence between their respective hierarchies has

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¹ Modernity, for Louis Dumont (1983), is an ideology characterized by contemporary individualism and incompatible with holism which subordinates the individual in a hierarchy which encompasses its opposite through an internal distinction of identity. The relations of persons to others are higher valued than that of human to objects of nature. In the context of globalization, Arjun Apadurai (1996: 3-4) stresses modern subjectivity as a work of imagination (a collective social fact), where the cultural dimensions of globalization constructs imagined selves and imagined worlds that subvert earlier narratives. “…because of the rapid way in which they move through daily routines, electronic media provide resources for self-imagining as an everyday social project.”

² - In this paper I will be considering Indonesia and India and not trying to describe Europe where this took place much earlier. Western Europe entered the process of secularization slowly enough to develop political and religious theories of pluralism, economic explanations of industrialization and more recently analyses of globalization. Cf. René Rémond, Religion et Société en Europe. La secularisation aux XIXe et XXe siècle, 1789-2000. 1998. More recently, secularization processes have not encouraged pluralism but rather tried to prevent religion norms from becoming public ones.
forced partial rationalities and values into separate “pseudo-holisms” (Louis Dumont, 1983) among which politicians pretended one was the totality. This reflects the fluctuation of modernity between a certain cultural autonomy and its need (via la raison de l’Etat) for total control of that freedom which they cannot guarantee. The dynamics of media and migration straddles, encloses, both the nation-states practicing procedural (so-called “democratic”) legitimization and those practicing substantive forms of ideological and religious legitimization. The impossibility of finding a consensual accountability between “civil” society and the state reflects the confusion between secular social relations and “universal” would-be primordial values.

In the first half of the twentieth century in Europe the initial alternatives to modernity were fascism and communism. In the course of this century the Soviet Union, and later Communist China, attempted utopian and eschatological social programs, but finally without the means to make them take root except through extraordinary violence. Finally, both proved themselves not universal ideologies, but to broaden Dumont’s terminology, “pseudo-holisms”. In a word equality and hierarchy were obliged to compete. This phenomenon spread; collective identities of utopian Muslim regimes exhibited increasing tensions. Even French laïcité struggling to maintain its vaunted neutrality, was challenged. A weakening of the centrality of the nation states at the end of the twentieth century was accompanied the demographic diasporas created by almost total, worldwide, mobility which produced so-called “subdued” ethnic, local, regional and transnational identities. These have, or are in the process of redefining citizenship, and the laws and rights of their respective nation-states. Citizens have been creating “foreign” alliances through WEB-generated networking that put pressure on local political processes.

Appropriating modernity on one’s own (non-Western) terms favored ideologies of political correctness which viewed from the outside seemed to create untenable new totalities. According to S. Eisenstadt, the tensions between authentic indigenous and “Western” reflects that no way has yet been found to unravel the tensions that modernity creates. Sharing spaces, i.e. pluralism in a scene so ideologically charged, means that the utopia of modernity is an ever vanishing horizon whose disillusioned adherents veer off into new-found pseudo-holisms. Even here, this questioning of the limits of modernity is in itself a modern move. Such artificiality and fundamentalism are trapped in the very modernity they sought to escape. To understand the ongoing processes of counter-secularization, the only move left to us is to study comparatively different experiences of secularization. This modest essay is meant to be a contribution to such an anthropology.

The issue of what is secularization needs clarification. This process is a project and has relevance only vis-à-vis a given cultural context. Separation of “religion and state” means very different things in different cultures because their respective values are so differently articulated. Taken out of its European context, secularism can become an ideological tool of cultural destruction. Secularism is not a good in itself although the features of its justification (i.e. Charles Taylor’s “over-lapping consensus”) and the bases of its adoption tell us about “good” as understood in the societies from which the promoters of secularization came. In fact it has rarely created this over-lapping consensus when exported.

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3 This introduction was inspired by reading S.N. Eisenstadt’s essay on multiple modernity’s in the winter issue (2000) of Daedalus.
5 As Aristotle identified it more than two thousand years ago, the “Good”, is a key question in the construction of any polis, hence the need for a analysis of morality. In China secularization was deliberately programmed irrespective to the cultural history, of the Chinese understanding of good. And yet despite the violence the Chinese cultural revolution provoked many of the burned books and leveled temple have reappeared from their Chinese ashes in the last two decades.
In the 2012 Dumont Centenary conference, Joel Robbins forcefully proposed that in each cultural area, one must clarify the cultural differences that structure different secularizations in order to escape the dead-end of those social scientists whose only heuristic tool to understand society are explanations of relations of power. To pursue Louis Dumont’s intellectual legacy and study secularization, we need to deploy a comparative anthropology of morality, of the cultural capital of the “Good’s” place in the articulation of a social morphology. Empirical observations of hierarchies of values should produce scenarios which should contribute to the anthropology of morality.

Where religious traditions have been dilapidated, the transmission of spiritual authority is diluted through a fragmentation of rapidly accessible charisma. These revivals are presented as authenticity and such fundamentalism is now found globally in every belief system. If such a general description of fundamentalism is widely accepted today, what is more difficult is to describe in detail, chronologically, its development in a given country, and to compare it with secularization as found in the hybrid fabrics of other non-European societies.

1) (De-)secularization in the Russian Federation: 9

Secularization theory is the basis of much of the ideology of modernity, pluralism and fundamental human rights, and, as such, is a vital part of a widely accepted political value system. Russian non-secularized modernity presents a challenge to the modern state’s adoption of individualism, hence an axiom of neutrality towards. What lies behind that challenge arises from the dialogical nature of shared faith as opposed to a univocal, monological ontology of religion. The word secularization, while it exists in Russian, and varies in levels of (mis-) understanding is not a value as, for instance, is the notion of tolerance. Even in the midst of massive social change where the goal posts keep moving in the 1870’s Dostoevsky has Father Paissy (in the Brothers Karamazoz) claim that the state should not transform the church but rather the church should transform the state and all of society. This notion of the churching of society received broad attention in those decades, yet at the same time (on a different) level the reform of ecclesiastical courts,

6 As everyone is aware, the ways in which a religious good or value is conceptualized have very local genealogies, usually holistic in outreach while the European notion of religious freedom has often become unmoored from their societies of origin as it was be exported under the name of secularization to recently decolonized states.
7 - Any analysis of secularization is not purely academic as both of the two societies studied here, India (1946+) and Indonesia (1965+), have recently suffered pogroms between communities, nominally for religious reasons.
8 - For instance the purification of Indonesian Islam from its local customs and accretions (especially Javanism) led to a fundamentalism through the Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama movements described in section two below, but these were both conservative and modern reformations of Indonesian Islam. In fact conservatism and modernity go quite well hand in hand. In India’s central states, the appearance of Hindutva, a fundamentalist Hindu cultural and political movement in the 1970’s, prevented the India from pursuing its secular course, as communalism concocted from of cultural and political boundaries destroyed the collective identities that Gandhi had strived to reinforce.
9 The description below are adapted from my book (2010) Christ after communism, Spiritual Authority and its Transmission in Moscow Today. (Orthodox Research Institute, NH, USA), 574 pages, respectively pp. 476-478; 8-10;479; and 511-517.
10 - The best discussion of the socio-linguistics of contemporary Russia in English is Nancy Ries’ Russian Talk. Culture and conversation during Perestroika (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1997). See for example her discussion of sacrifice as a value (pp. 144-148) and passim, the notion of suffering.
leaving the bishops administrative authority but not full judicial authority was also an important topic of concern. Dostoevsky treated that issue as the mundane utilitarianism of secular church members. A contemporary example of the scale of secularization: in public schools where the foundations of religious culture is introduced but taught from an atheist point of view, as a purely cultural phenomena. I mention this because the issues of secular reform take on very different features in different realms of Russian social life and they change differential rates. Therefore there is little point of talking about secularization in general. Nonetheless here I will identify at least sketchily the Russian social morphology which conditions the Orthodox religious renaissance.

An Encompassing Faith & a Sacrifice of Praise. The constant reference of the Orthodox to their Christian cosmology (creation, fall and redemption) suggests that their worldview is still holistic. Solzhenitsyn, Pasternak and Sinyavksy claimed again and again that the error of scientific atheism was that it violated the integrity, the wholeness of life by isolating religion from the center of society. To rebuild the spiritual foundations of Russia one had to reconnect the sacred and the secular. The notion that Russia was built on a spiritual foundation is the basis of the recent agreement to introduce course with just that name into secondary education. Nevertheless it does not obviate the massive presence of post-Soviet secularism “inside” which Christianity is re-emerging. The Russian Orthodox Church has not been part of a traditional holistic society since the end of the 1600s. Dimitry Pospielovsky has written, “Peter’s real innovation then consisted not in the Europeanization of Russia but in the introduction of totalitarianism and secularization.”

Any analysis of the use of the term “holy” Russia of the twenty-first century should thus be qualified as a partial, “pseudo-holism” to use Dumont’s terminology. In 1721, Peter

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12 A century earlier M.M. Shcherbatov published his On the Corruption of Morals in Russia (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969) in which he analyses the excesses of the necessary reforms of Peter the Great at the beginning of the eighteenth century. This text was largely forgotten after the appearance of Karamzin’s History of the Russian State in 1818 and 1826, yet his analysis of the reforms under Peter the Great of the serving gentry (dvoryanstvo) were pertinent. Henceforth the nobility were required to serve a lifelong career in the army of the bureaucracy. This nobility was given hereditary family estates (votchina) and serfs to work these lands. Over several generations, individual families were credited for the long-standing service to the state. Under Catherine the Great and Peter II power slipped from the hands of the tsar to that of the nobility. In 1730 a constitution was drawn up to limit the sovereign’s power through a Senate or Parliament.
15 That outlook and cosmology of traditional societies described here is often preserved in modern societies as a partial holism. The inherited religious perspectives of quasi-traditional societies are based on participation in and communion with the nomina of these faiths. Such communion is collective. An outsider cannot know the communal, or corporate, transmission of religious perspective, which for an insider is self-evident, although the outsider may perceive certain outward behavior of the community through his/her own tools of perception. Also, a subjective representation in the mind of the “private” outside observer of the Orthodox community excludes such communion by definition. Cf. Louis Dumont,
the Great decapitated the patriarchate, replacing its head with a synod based on a Lutheran model according to his ukase the “Spiritual Regulation.” This resembled nothing so much as laicization. Nonetheless the dismantling of the caesaro-papal Byzantine symphony was neither final nor definitive, for as Alexander Schmemann wrote:

“What far the reality might have digressed from the symphony ideal, [the digressions] were always perceived as digressions… because the state [of the Byzantine-Roman autocratic tradition] recognized that above its authority stood the Church [as] guardian of Christian Truth. Western absolutism, having developed from the duel between state and Church, left for the latter only the function of ‘serving the spiritual needs’ as defined, however, by the state, which also defined how these needs are to be served.”

After the two earlier secularizations, that under Peter the Great (reigned 1672–1725) and that under the Bolsheviks (twentieth century), social historians are asking whether a third secularization using imported Western European values is inevitable in Russia. Admittedly the Orthodox Church is historically the principal memory of the Russian people, but can this church also contextualize modern contemporary Russia in the “horizon of transcendence” of Orthodox Christianity? By the term “horizon of transcendence,” I understand a perspective that transcends individualism and constructs a social morphology through a shared hierarchy of values. Such a sobor (communion) of Christians will include both the contemporary generation and all the preceding ones that inspire its cultural and religious values. Thought of in this way, the transmission of faith implies organic links between members of the church belonging to the same framework of time and space. In times of persecution apostolic succession may not be assured by bishops, but by all martyred Christians to become on the cross “contemporaries” of Christ.

Sociological description brings center stage the presuppositions of secularism endowed with a quasi-dogmatic status. If during the twentieth century Russian and European

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16 Quoted by Pospielovsky, (1998), p. 107. See also Stephane Vibert, “La Russie, le temps et l’espace: Transformations du socio-cosmisme et construction d’une modernité hybride,” in: *L’Homme*, no. 166, (2003), pp. 145–170. “When, after Peter the Great, the Russian monarch no longer recapitulates the Christian message by ‘living like Christ’, it is more important than ever to understand that the essence of the (Orthodox) Church is an interior holiness where Christ is the head and the Holy Spirit the soul, whose essence is the liberty of the Spirit united to oneself.” Vibert continues saying, “… Peter the Great henceforth will lead his people using an artificial mode of power based on a dualist and antinomian hierarchy of values: pure/impure; old/modern; Eastern/ Western. The Westernization of the Russian Empire is reinterpreted in terms of good and bad societies. The elite is distinguished from the people. The Tsar, using his bureaucracy, holds the power but no longer leads the people to salvation, therefore the people hold this authority. The freedom of man, submission to God and to the community, become a single reality, the way to become Christian (English translation by S.C.H.).

17 I discussed this concept in several lectures, initially at the Institute of Asian and African Studies, University of Jerusalem (November, 1, 2005), in “Raising the Heavens in central Java: contemporary Christian and Muslim reaffirmations of transcendence.”

18 Sonja Luehrmann, *Secularism, Soviet Style* (2011:22) insists that “seeing secularism as a strategy for managing religious diversity…offers a corrective to studies of post-Soviet and post post-Soviet religious
secularization further separated Church and state yet it was through different historical processes, for their starting point was also different. As the contrast of Byzantine caesaro-papism and Roman papo-caesarism suggests, the eastern “priesthood” of the emperor may well have created a more submissive church, but it also left Christian anthropology more intact. Individualism had to be imported. The document of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) entitled the “Basic Social Concept” (cf their WEBSITE, June, 2005) claimed that the saving of all by the One, the sacrifice and resurrection of the Word of God, cannot be understood or preserved using the axioms of individualism that were eventually produced by Western European thought which are based on a modern, fragmented anthropology bound to dissolve Christian holism. I think that the Russian Orthodox Church survived because it stressed spiritual as opposed to any temporal holism.

A second trend is re-enchantment\(^{19}\). In the Russian federation, this can be defined as the rediscovery of the ancient traditions of Russian Christian life, and principally, but not exclusively, that of prayer. Ten or fifteen years after the Millennium of the Baptism of Russia (1988), the initial work of re-opening destroyed churches was more or less complete, yet the work of building new parishes was just beginning. In the Moscow city landscape at the beginning of the twenty-first century, from the perspective of the church, life was centered on the gradual conversion of Russians with the help of other recent converts, i.e. the newly converted laymen and recently ordained deacons and priests. There is often, but not always, a freshness in this presentation of the Orthodox tradition by recent converts that smacks of authenticity. If the priest is boring or nonchalant, or the layman is overbearing with a hothouse piety, there are many others who are not. For many priests, preaching or listening to confessions has meant a deep ascetical cultivation of inner affect.

**The Legacy of the Martyrs.** In Moscow today Orthodox often tell visitors that the faith, transmitted to them at the end of the twentieth century and reanimated by the revival of parish life, was only possible due to the grace and the prayers of the innumerable twentieth-century martyrs. This is a challenging statement for someone who has not lived in Russia. A visit to one of the Russian Golgothas (the killing fields of Butovo, Levashovo, Magadan\(^{20}\), Kuropaty, Belarus, etc. are so-called in Russian) does a lot to persuade the visitor of the depth of these convictions concerning the new martyrs of the church. While in Europe few would say that divine grace contributes to the construction of inner affect.

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\(^{19}\) The is term has been recently used and criticized by Peter Berger and Marcel Gauchet, among others, as an approximate opposite of Max Weber’s famous neologism “disenchantment” (literally, the “evacuation of magic”), invented to describe the increasing rationalization of nineteenth-century Europe.

\(^{20}\) With its monumental “Mask of Mourning” by Ernst Neizvestny. Commissioned in 1990, this sculpture “to the victims of Stalinism” is located in the Siberian “Triangle of Suffering” and was dedicated in 1996.
of social equality, devout Russian Orthodox claim that the witness of the Christian martyrs of Russia’s twentieth century is thought to be the ultimate spiritual exploit or struggle (*podvig*) that allowed them to draw near to Christ and intercede for those who had gone before, thus reinforcing the social linkage and societal fabric in general. Many Russians have reached the point where the claim of democratic values to produce a coherent social whole has lost credibility. They would agree with what St. Augustine (345–430) pithily expressed many centuries ago in a six-word Latin aphorism: “If all things were equal, nothing would exist.”

They are ready to look to those who have sacrificed their lives for their faith to find a higher life, a more inclusive hierarchy of values than the European Union seems to provide.

To capture the sense of this church morphology Inna Naletova quotes from the scientist and priest Pavel Florensky (martyred c. 1937):

> “The impossibility of defining Orthodox church-hood (*tserkovnost*) is the best proof of its vitality.” The eighteenth-century approach to the administration of religion was part and parcel of the secularization of religious education instituted by Peter the Great (reigned 1672–1725). It was not until a hundred years after Peter’s death that the Slavophiles reacted against this occidentalization by claiming that the values associated with *sobornost*, community and collectivism, should not be abolished and were still important to Russians. Half a century later the novelist Dostoevsky insisted that social protest based on the primacy of reason and political will is meaningless; without humility as an antidote to hedonism and individualism, Enlightenment values lead to moral vacuum and despair. At the dawn of the Communist dictatorship the theologian Serge Bulgakov and the philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev reiterated this earlier claim that all social illnesses are caused by loss of faith. If for many urban Russians today, Russian nationalism and culture are totally secularized concepts, but for the 1917–18 Moscow Church Council it was clear that the church’s religious renewal should be based on integrating asceticism and *sobornost* into daily life. It is against that aborted renewal early in the twentieth century that one should try to understand the current revival of the Orthodox Church in the city of Moscow. As early as the 1980s, Father Alexander Men decried the model of Christianity that denied it a religious cultural expression. For Father Alexander it was important that Christianity participate in the de-secularization of science, and indeed during the early 1990s a remarkable religious revival touched the urban and well-educated segments of the population. Prof. Osipov has written that this revival can take other forms, however, such as the re-imagining of deformed traditions

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21 “*Non essent omnia, si essent aequalia*”: Saint Augustine, in *De diversis questionibus octoginta tribus*, question 41, line 3.


23 The is movement dates from the early nineteenth century. Its founder was Alexei Khomyakov (1804–60).

24 Cf. Berdaiæv’s two books: *A New Middle Ages* (Russian edition, 1924) and *On Inequality*.


27 Naletova, (2006), Ch. 1, p. 12.
that celebrate not Christian living, but external, worldly splendor.\textsuperscript{28} The first nationwide survey of religious beliefs, undertaken in 1988 by the St. Petersburg institute VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center, www.wciom.com), began with lists of associations Russians make with the word “God.”\textsuperscript{29} Many of the subsequent surveys used multiple choice formats that contained partially slanted questions in which the negative options outnumbered the positive. I. Naletova counters saying that even if only a few Russians visited churches in 1989, it is significant that over forty percent had pious associations with the name of God, while fifty-six percent were indifferent or negative.

**Taking Leave of Secularization?** Over the last fifteen years the “de-secularization” of the world has become topical. This has sometimes been described as counter-secularization. (cf P. Berger (ed.) 1999). Churches are said to have two strategies open to them; rejection of modernity or adaptation. Rejection permits the creation of a religious sub-culture inside a larger secularized society. This approach is “recommended” by that fact that religious groups that have refused to adapt to modernity have often flourished in the second half of the twentieth century. But if fundamentalism fossilizes tradition depriving it of any deep understanding, it also forces the fundamentalism to seek for power in society to replace that loss of genuine spontaneous authority.

If it is not possible to “re-conquer” a whole society, even the proposition is an admission of the defeat of one’s values. In Moscow, the survivors of Russia’s twentieth century holocaust stressed the value they remained faithful to gave them an unusual experience of God. I feel fortunate to have become acquainted with some of these Orthodox witnesses of that generation, who have since passed away: Father Victor Shipolvanikov in 2007, the icon painter, Irina V. Vatagina, and the “man of prayer” (melitvonik), Patriarch Alexis II in 2008, and Matushka Ekaterina Krechetova and Father Alexander Kulikov in 2009. Father Alexander Kulikov, the rector of St. Nikolai Klenniki, typifies the best of the generation whose lives began before World War II and whose memory of and critical respect for the pre-revolutionary period was crucial in their approach to the re-opening of churches in the 1990’s. They belonged to the generation which had known the martyrs of the Stalinist Terror (1937–38). From the perspective of a Muscovite born in the year of the millennium of the baptism of Russia (1988), what happened before that date is part of a “past” and possibly of limited relevance to their present. Yet in the hearts of those who “belong to the church”, whose mindset is formed by the experience of the Orthodox Church, the witness and lives of those who have preceded them in the past were shaped by the plan and purpose of the Holy Spirit in view of their future, in view of the twenty-first century. Secularists who feel that reason not faith should guide public life and institutions find an easy target in the “backward mentality” of the Russian Orthodox Church.\textsuperscript{30} Despite this claim, however, the Orthodox

\textsuperscript{29} Naletova, (2006), Ch. 1, p. 15, Table 1.
\textsuperscript{30} They are not alone. In a recent book in Russian(*The Tragedy of Russia* (2009)), Father Georgi Mitrofanov, mentioned above, a priest and specialist on the martyrs and confessors of the twentieth century, decries the refusal of the current government to grant access to the archives of all of the painful and tragic episodes of the Communist regime during the twentieth century. He argues that to forget what the Russians lived through is extremely dangerous for their future. But above and beyond that risk, he asks why the government has taken this approach to modern Russian history. His answer is without ambiguity:
Church is forward looking; first of all theologically, for the Orthodox liturgical year’s main feasts refer to the future; Easter, Pentecost, Transfiguration and Dormition deal with the ultimate destiny of mankind. The vision of the future of society implies that in each generation the faith is not re-invented, but revealed yet again by the Holy Spirit, the Comforter (Paraclet), the Spirit of Truth who teaches and reveals all things.

An ethnography of an immediate present is not possible with this diachronic perspective. At best one can describe the recent past. The reforms proposed by the Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill, at the December 2009 Moscow diocesan conference (the largest diocese in the Orthodox world) provide for a new canonical regulation for the parishes, with an enlarged sphere of activity extending well beyond the walls of the Church. They provide for an increased number of lay medical and social workers on the parish pay roll and a more equitable remuneration of the clergy. This suggests the beginning of a new period under a new patriarch, and an end to the twenty years of unavoidable improvisation that characterized the two decades that followed the celebration of the Millennium of the Baptism of Russia (1988).

This new Patriarch of “Moscow and all the Russia’s”, Kirill (Gundaev), has marked the beginning of his administration of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2009 by his insistence on catechesis to large public gatherings, as well as on television and via the internet. He seeks to reach the immense majority of nominal Russian Orthodox who have yet to enter into the life of the Church. In his sermon at the Dormition Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin for the Feast of St. Kirill and Methodius on Sunday May 24, 2009, he preached that the integrity of the faith is woven from small acts in daily life that come together with the witness of other Christians to form a whole life style, an ethos, the fullness of the stature of Christian living. Secular individualism is combated by such an ethos, a hierarchy of values which reveals humanity’s transcendence. This sermon is typical of the Russian Orthodox Church’s new reaction to secular humanism, a reaction echoed in the writing of persons as different as Deacon Andrei Kuraev and Father Vsevolod Chaplin.

Modernity has clearly not taken the same road in Russia as in Western Europe; where secularization put religion in its “place”, the private subjective sphere, stripping it of the attributes of objective values. Religion was more than relegated to a private sphere in Soviet Russia. It was so persecuted by the Communists that one had every reason to expect that it would disappear altogether. Paradoxically both Communism and the ideology of pluralism tacitly agreed that religion should leave the public sphere as much as possible; for the former in order to eliminate obscurantism, and for the latter in order to avoid the potential violence it was assumed would accompany the public practice of religion.

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because the current government sees itself as the legal successor to the USSR and not to the pre-revolutionary historical Russia. The current government recognizes itself in the Communist era.

31 International Herald Tribune 10.VI.09, p. 3: Sophia Kishkovsky, “New Patriarch pulls no punches” on two recent youth meetings in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
The current “leave-taking” of religion is in some ways in and of itself a retreat from the premises of the Enlightenment, for by becoming alienated, “secularized” from its own source of inspiration, rational individualism condemned itself to an eventual disappearance.

For certain contemporary Moscow academics, modeling themselves on the Western European sociology of religion, the return of Orthodoxy is defined as “re-enchantment,” whereas the “insiders,” the Orthodox, see it as a demonstration that the secularization of Soviet society coming to an end. To put it more positively and to use the British Anglican David Martin’s phrase, “The sociology of culture is necessarily a sociology of morals.” And that because we live “… in a moral environment saturated in the combined effects of enlightened universalism and versions of Christian universalism … clearly secularization is something more profound than declines in belief and practice”.

Especially in the Western European context, the profundity that Martin is putting forward refers to Christian language which continues to be a distinctive mode of speech still capable of making a critique of political power and violence by breaking free from the moral environment of secularized reason. The Orthodox in Moscow illustrates this in very different figures of speech: they invariably explain how their religious renaissance occurred by invoking the grace of the blood of their martyrs. Thanks to a remnant of the Orthodox, men and women martyrs who incarnated by their deaths the authority of the faith, the Church survived from the 1920’s until the 1980’s. As mentioned above they were responsible for the re-opening of parish life to the inhabitants of Moscow. The

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32 David Martin, On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory, (2005).; Cf also Ecumenical News International/ 25 May 2012) pp. 185, 187. Russian Orthodox Church faces criticism for government links By Jonathan Luxmoore 25 May (ENNews)--A senior Russian Orthodox priest has been attacked by left-wing politicians after he criticized opposition parties and called for a "strong personified central power" to govern the country. "It is increasingly evident from our television screens that Orthodox Christianity is being used to justify the current regime," a Communist Party secretary, Valery Rashkin, told Russia's Interfax news agency on 25 May. "According to its constitution, Russia is a secular state. But the lukewarm attitude shown to our country's basic law by our two leaders is apparently infectious. It is prompting Russian Orthodox hierarchs to claim a key role in the socio-political life of our country, which is both multi-ethnic and multi-faith, and contains many atheists too," he said. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, chair of the church's department for church-society relations, told Russia's Sobesednik weekly on 24 May that opposition groups had "nothing to offer" and would not persuade ordinary people to "accept their principles." Chaplin was also criticized by Sergei Udaltsov, leader of Russia's Left Front party, who accused him of joining a propaganda campaign from President Vladimir Putin's United Russia party. "Chaplin is working ... to discredit and smear the civil movement and opposition," Udaltsov told Interfax on 25 May. The Orthodox Church has been widely criticized this year for alleged close links with Putin, whose 4 March election to a third term as head of state, after four years as Russian premier, was contested in nationwide street protests. It was the latest of many controversial statements by the 44-year-old archpriest, who last November defended his country's right to control "negative tendencies" from abroad by restricting religious freedom. Speaking on 17 May at Moscow's St. Tikhon Orthodox University, he said Western society was dominated by "material benefits, pride, supercilious self-fulfillment and pluralism," which contradicted Gospel ideals, and vowed his own church would "open doors to a better life" for Europe.

Messages of congratulation from Patriarch Kirill I to new members of the Russian government were posted on 25 May on the Moscow Patriarchate's website. In a 24 May telegram, Putin paid tribute to Kirill's "high reputation in Russia and abroad," and praised the Orthodox church for performing an "educational and social mission" with the state for the "moral status and development of society."
Russian Orthodox did not come to this understanding of the martyrs’ heroism only after the fall of the Soviet Union. If the prophet of the nineteenth century Dostoevsky was well aware of a pan-European metaphysical anxiety, his novels took it in an unusual direction: the appearance of God in the context of disbelief. For, as the intellectual obstacles to this belief in God grew stronger, Dostoevsky yearned to overcome them through a unique artistic realism. Nicholas Arseniev writing in France, just after the Iron Curtain had descended in 1947 (1948:144), concludes his sketch of nineteenth century “Holy Moscow” by saying that her greatest glory was yet to come with her twentieth century martyrs: The new martyrs and confessors of the Christian faith belong to this same period ... Moscow’s greatest claim to glory lies in the fact that while it was the center of the most militant atheism ever ... because of this she became the hub of a courageous and bloody martyrdom, “for the Word of God and witness to Jesus.” (Apoc. 1,9) … from these martyrs arose a new comforting, fortifying, regenerating force that perhaps will one day renew the moral and spiritual life of the Russian people. For the new generation times have changed radically and so also the content of the spirit and effect of their fight with atheism. Why in “post-Communist” Russia is religion coming back even timidly? I believe it is because of the way it survived in the Soviet period. The three citations below will illustrate what this demanded.

• During the Bolshevik Revolution, starets Alexis Mechev became endowed with prescientia or clairvoyance. He felt the pain of total strangers when they approached him and so it was that he was able to comfort them and often they became his most faithful parishioners. The corollary of this compassion was a deep asceticism. In 1918, as people began to flee to the Ukraine and abroad, Father Alexis would paraphrase the prophet Jeremiah about refusing the Lord’s correction (42:10-22), telling them that one cannot flee the wrath of God, that it was useless to try to “save” Russia and that instead one had to drink the bitter cup of Russia’s suffering. The interface of militant secularization is for St. Alexis Mechev a kenotic and sacrificial one where he proposes that one bears witness to the Orthodox faith by paying for its failures and “absorbing” into one’s person the causes of Russia’s disintegration.

• In the worst years of the Stalinist Terror, Father Vsevolod Shpiller(2002:455–458) preached, while still in Sofia (Bulgaria) and before he returned to Russia (1949) a sermon for All Saints’ Day (the first Sunday after Pentecost; in the Orthodox calendar May 28, 1936): “Only he who practices full submission to the will of God can be saved … [this is the providence which] the soul of man thirsts after… Everything in his experience teaches him that only through suffering can one acquire true historic progress … That is why revolt against suffering is a revolt against and a refusal of the supreme meaning of life. Not to accept suffering is not to accept the order of the world as established by God. And at the same time it is to reject the possibility of a perfect human life … It for this reason that not only does one not flee suffering, but one goes to meet it.” Only true submission to the will of God, say the Orthodox in Moscow parishes, can teach the faith. Only the prophetical Word experienced in the prayer life of the Church can bring this into
their lives. It is through the very “ordinary” parish practices of religion that Russia is reviving its faith. Here eschatology is spontaneous; social service expresses a naive faith, that is to say, one without instrumentalization.

• Fifteen years after Mikhail Gorbachev began *perestroika*, Father Ioann Krestiankin (2007:114) was still writing in June 2000 to lay persons, “What becomes of a man without purifying sufferings … the time has come when people will only be saved by sorrows.” *Kenosis*, that self-emptying of one’s own will in order to receive God’s plan for salvation, has been brought center stage in Christian spirituality by the Soviet experience.

**Non-totalizing Integration, a Contemporary Russian Orthodox Holism?**

Viewed from the outside the Russian Orthodox Church, and its place in Russian society, presents the morphology of a pseudo-holism. By that I mean a full hierarchy of values, while not adopted by the whole of society, *adequately explains the cosmology of an important historical part of Russian society*. To understand the influence of a church initially relegated to the margins of the Russian Federation, one cannot invoke any totality modeled on that of state hegemony. We have to understand that its religious morphology is characterized by a *non-totalizing integration*. The Russian Orthodox Church explains its existence by the theology of the incarnation. The Word of God, having taken flesh, demonstrates God’s belief in man whom he created in his own image and likeness. Christ preached an ineffable hierarchy of values (the Sermon on the Mount, Gospel of Matthew ch. 5) which for Christians constitutes “the life of the world.” For the secularist, the Church’s changing relations with the state have been taken to be the hallmark of each new phase in the secularization of Russian society; for the Russian Orthodox Church it is the experience of God’s belief in man that deprives successive periods of secularization of their accumulated impact. The position of the Church is marginal demographically and sociologically, yet as an institution of meaning, it confronts the hollowness of the Russian institutions of governance from a position of strength. In the current crisis of representation, the Orthodox faith makes a very large claim: history, despite all its horrors, manifests God’s providence. The quotes above from three spiritual fathers above say nothing less.

2) *Secularization in Indonesia*:

In many non-European countries customary law was displaced by the law of their nation-states only at the beginning of the twentieth century. In some cases even the vocabulary for secularization did not exist, for example the neologism for “society” (*masyarakat*) only appeared in Javanese in the nineteen-twenties. Secularization in Indonesia moved from displacement of

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*adat*, customary law, to struggles over Pancasila\(^{35}\), the Republic’s ideology of pluralistic monotheism to efforts at legislated *shari’a*. This progression was non-eliminatory for all three of these normative sets of values are still at work in Indonesian society today, albeit in subordinate ways.

During the nineteenth century Dutch colonial law dominated what there was of Indonesian legal culture: i.e. an assemblage of oral customary law used in village deliberations and Islamic jurisprudence formulated by judges (*hakim*) trained in *madrasa*. The Dutch version of colonial pluralism defined separate races and regions. Islam had been present since the sixteenth century and had been the main ferment in the Java Wars of the 1820’s led by Prince Dipanegara.(1785-1855) The early 20\(^{th}\) century saw an increase in the number of Indonesian *hajis*. Due to this there was a growing awareness of the faith and the level of training in *fiqh* increased and *shari’a* became an increasingly visible constituent of Indonesian Islam.

Beginning in the 1910’s Indonesian Muslims had realized that they belonged to a common archipelago-wide community of the faithful (*umma*) despite their differences of language and insular origins. Muslim social welfare organizations, such as the Muhammediyah created in 1912 and the Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926, grew rapidly. The Serikat Islam (1921) was the most important of several anti-colonial movements leading the nationalist’s cause at the beginning of the twentieth century.

After the Japanese occupation and despite Islam’s broad influence in the first half of the twentieth century, the first principles of *Pancasila* were adopted in the August 1945 constitution, but the so-called Jakarta Charter (the “obligation to implement Islamic *shari’a*\(^{36}\) for its adherents”) was not. The Christians in eastern Indonesia had threatened to secede from the nascent Republic over these few words.

The young Indonesian republic in the 1950’s began promoting Pancasila pluralism\(^{37}\).

The Soeharto regime (1965-1998) attempted to manage Indonesian religions by enforcing a more secularized *Pancasila*. Even so, during Soeharto’s regime Islamic precepts were making inroads into government legislation and practices. The post-Soeharto period (May, 1998+) legitimated “legislated” islamization, ignoring *Pancasila* pluralism by instrumentalizing *shari’a* into an attractive political platform.

Indonesia’s recent experience with islamization on the national level, i.e. with counter-secularizations, after the fall of General Soeharto’s dictatorship (May, 1998), illustrates an incessant reconfiguring of cultural programs\(^{38}\). However, as soon as the violence that brought down General Soeharto subsided, on the village level various small associations (*panguyuban* and

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\(^{36}\) *Shari’a* is the moral code and “law” of Islam, more often applied through the filter of its cultural context than textually.

\(^{37}\) First proposed by Soekarno as the foundation of the republic to be in the summer of 1945, its five moral principles are: belief in one God; in a just and civilized humanity; in the unity of the Indonesian Republic; in a democracy guided by wisdom through deliberation and representation and in social justice for all the Indonesian peoples. The number five was justified on the basis of the five pillars of Islam, the five fingers of one’s hands, the five senses, and the five Pandawa brothers of the Mahabharata, which suffices to illustrate in syncretic character.

warga), had appeared to counter the violence of radical fundamentalist Islamic movements (golongan).

The kind of equality offered all religions (agama) in Soeharto’s version of Pancasila had created a state-sponsored evaluative indifference, a secularized pluralism which didn’t work because in fact some religions were ‘more equal than others’. It implied an ambiguous hierarchy of religions (middle Eastern monotheist over indigenous cults): on the one hand weakly civic as manipulated by the state ideology, and on the other, strongly mosque-bound.

With 50% of the Indonesian population Java is the most populous island in the archipelago. Java had long displayed a tendency towards social renewal via religious renewal. Javanese traditions “driven” by internal socio-cultural structures constituted a holistic dimension integrating any and every kind of social praxis penetrated pre-existing religious values. Looking at Java’s pseudo-holism today, it appears as a continual and sometimes a reinvention of earlier cosmologies. Even as the Dutch colonial regime marginalized customary law, the young republic in the 1950’s self-consciously grounded itself in Soekarno’s vision of the pluralism of Pancasila. In the last fifteen years however, politicians experimented with campaigns imposing shari’a which were finally not accepted by the population when consulted through voting.39 After the recent progressive islamization of Indonesian law, there immediately followed a return to the moderate “pluralism” of the original founders of the Republic based ideology of Pancasila. In the provinces even local adat, customary law, re-appeared as an alternative to national legislation, especially in land disputes.

Public piety became disenchanted with hardline islamization, society was not prepared with the ambiguities of enforced shari’a. To quote R. Hefner (2011:306), “…most Muslims contextualize their commitment to the shari’a”. For example customary law and shari’a’s relationships varied greatly in different ethnic areas of the archipelago. A Minangkabau (Sumatra) adage cited by Khairil Azhar (Jakarta Post January 11, 2013) shows how closely they can be linked: “tradition is based on shari’a and shari’a is based on the Koran” (adat basandi syara’, syara’ basandi kitabullah). The adage continues: “traditions apply to what shari’a dictates” (syara’ mangato, adat mamakai).

On-going Islamic renewal (tajdid) through Muslim social movements:

The Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama movements, sought the purification of Indonesian Islam from its local customs and accretions (especially Javanism). This led to a certain fundamentalism (the purifying of Islam from superstition) and still modernity (their opening up vás networks of social services) which went quite well hand in hand. Though these reforms sought the purification of Islam they represented a ‘secularisation’ of the former belief system according to non-local rational norms. The relation between between re-conversion and secularisation is complex. In1965-66 anti-Communist pogroms committed by the NU Muslim militia Ansor provoked important numbers of conversions to Christianity.

After 1965, with General Soeharto’s secularization of religion’s role in society, (only religions of the book were taught in schools and the government required that a “monotheist” religion to figure on one’s ID card), the traditionally progressive Muhammadiyah became “santrified”, controlled by the priorities of the strict Muslims. however, by 2004 purification and arabization of

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39 In the decade after 1998 after the resurgence of rigorist Islam failed politically; support shifted from the Jakarta charter (obligatory Islamic practice for Muslims) to the piagam Madinah. Its three main articles were proclaimed by Muhammad in 622 at the time of the first Hijrah and sought to institutionalize the Koran and the Sunnah as the sources of Islamic living. Cf. Stephen C. Headley et David Parkin (editors), Islamic prayer across the Indian Ocean. Inside and Outside the Mosque.
Indonesian Islam became more problematic with the arrival in Muhammediyah of many peasants still attached to spirit-worship, superstitions called “innovations” deviating from monotheism (in abbreviation, TBC: belief in spirits innovation and superstitions or tahayul, bida & churafat). Influenced by Muslim *dakwah* (proselytizing) movements, these renewed commitments to Islam, sometimes were accompanied by the reappearance of peasant syncretistic practices. This is one way certain traditional pre-Islam influences can re-emerge.

In the post Soeharto period (1998+), these two big Muslim social movements (NU and Muhammediyah) were increasingly fragmented by internal conflicts (conservative vs. reformists). New forms of Muslim representation were initiated by vibrant radical student organizations, until these “liberal” movements were attacked during the subsequent crisis of tolerance.

**Nahdlatul Ulama (NU): “Paying the price of power”:** The NU paid a dearly for their leader’s (Abdurrahman Wahid’s, alias Gus Dur, (1940-2009) election as president of the Indonesian republic (1999-2001). After this election, his impeachment provoked a partial decline of the lively intellectual Islamic debates proper to the NU due to internal frictions between conservative and liberals. A few months after his death in December 2009, NU understood it would do better to return to its original religious and social orientation, Their Muslim boarding schools (*pesantren*) and mosque-based NGO’s had vast social welfare networks. Still in all, Abdurrahman Wahid had managed to leave a strong legacy of tolerance for the NU.

In March 2001 the Network of Liberal Muslims (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*) was founded by Ulil Abshar-Abdalla along with others in order to “open the doors of “*ijtihad*” (individual interpretation), but the attempts by these liberals, so applauded by the international media and some said, financed by the “West”, were criticized by certain Muslim university students. The *Islam kiri* (left) fraction the NU students movement, which agreed with Network of Liberal Muslims’s (JIL) anti-*shari’a* position, still censored them for presenting a dichotomy between the “religion” of Western Liberalism (agents of international capitalism), whereas the fundamentalists represent the religion of the Middle East.

There is no Al-Azhar Mosque and university in Indonesia. During the “greening” (Islamization) of the Soeharto regime during the 1980’s, the Indonesian Board of Muslim Ulama (MUI) increasingly used its semi-official position (labeling *halal* products, etc.) to issue *fatwa* that should only been considered as interpretations. They condemned inter-religious marriage, banning Christmas greetings by Muslims, supported government policies on family planning and transmigration. In this the MUI was preceded by a similar trend in Malaysia. In July 2005 the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, (SBY) called for a clearer demarcation between religion and government, but the MUI went ahead with a *fatwa* condemning the Ahmadiyah Muslim “sect”. In 2009 the MUI went further by condemning the practice of yoga for being Hindu whereas many Indonesian Muslims practiced it. When the MUI condemned electoral abstainers (*golongan putih*) as *haram*, liberal movements joined together in a Forum Umat Islam to lobby against the self-proclaimed MUI

**Secularization astride nationalism and Islamic Identity.** During and after the Soeharto military regime, the promotion of secularization by the Indonesian Republic did not have the anticipated effect of creating religious tolerance. This explains how, after the tensions associated with the *shari’a* campaign and a more ostentatious less tolerant practice of Islam, a multi confessional

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40 Since Malaysian religious official esteemed the name of God, Allah, to be untranslatable, over the last thirty years non-Muslim citizen were forbidden to use the word Allah in their writing despite the fact that for over a hundred years this has been the word Malaysian Christians use to address the Lord, both in prayers and in writings. The region of Sabah in Malaysia is by majority Christian; violent attacks on Churches broke out in 2010, but finally subsided and now a new translation of the Bible has appeared suing the word Allah to designate God.
vision of Indonesia’s fivefold Pancasila has experienced a modest revival. These short term (decade-long) fluctuations are indicative of a longer term instability associated with modernity. The tension between Islamic religious revival/purification and intolerance, one senses the fallout of the loss of the transmission of an earlier tradition, due only partly to the politicization of Islam. Despite the recent pogroms in the Moluccas and the break up of the Nahdhatul Ulama into three political parties, religious revival may yet be spurred by the very Javanese value of tolerance⁴¹. How so?

Over the last sixty years radicalism in Indonesian Islam was spurred by three factors:

1) in the late 1950’s under Soekarno repression of political Islam after 1950’s;
2) in the name of secularization the instrumentalization of religion by the New Order dictatorship. This created a complex of victimization “justified” violent reactions;
3) the political, moral and security void during the first years of Reformasi (1998+).

Having assumed a central position in national identity and at all levels of the state, Islam can no longer pretend to be a victim, so counter-secularization is less credible. Islam as a political mobilizing factor has been partially dissolved into nationalism, confining Islam to a morally conservative more social register. The nationalist movement was always attached to the religious status quo, supposedly federating tolerance and pluralism as norm. Over the last three decades (1980+), Islamic revival faced with Western “democratic” hegemony, had no alternative, no radical socio-political counter project, only a certain mode of appropriation, ie Western behavioral norms expressed in Muslim terms. But an identity-based posture allowed only a limited diversity in forms of expression in its effort at renewal. Clearly the university –based student movements were more “progressive” than the larger Muslim social movements. Muslim conservatism has clipped the wings of the nascent Islamic liberalism. The religious tolerance they sought to promote has diminished resulting in the strengthening of interfaith boundaries. With the “purification of indigenous Islam, syncretistic practices declined but the persistence of the phenomenon of renewal of social networks through religion may well mean that this is only temporary⁴².

3 ) Secularization in India: hierarchy, suppressed and renascent.

In the centre of Delhi near Connaught Place is the Gol (round) Market. On its south side high up on the wall is a large black and white inscription saying: “DEMOCRATIC SECULAR SPIRITUALLY”. To encapsulate the contradictions that this slogan captures in the Indian mindset as they have been widely discussed by Indian sociologists, I list below the key events of its historical background:

(1)After the 1857 Sepoy revolt when the British East India Company was replaced by the British empire and its viceroy, during the first British state census throughout India, utilized caste ranking. This fragmentation and administrative segmentation of identities within the British Empire, later decried by the nationalists who claimed that the true whole was “Mata Bharat” (Mother India). (2)The Indian nationalist Congress party was initially dominated by English Oxbridge -educated Brahmans. (3)From the 1890’s-1930’s caste histories and in certain cases fresh

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⁴² Cf. RSIS: Indonesia’s National Elections: Islamic Parties at the Crossroads (January 10, 2013) by Adhi Priamarizki, Synopsis:“Indonesian Islamic parties have been adopting an inclusive and pragmatic strategy for garnering votes. The formal establishment of Shariah law is no longer a primary objective in their agenda. Nevertheless, these parties still have to settle several issues.”
genealogies were created to rank castes which provided upward mobility for some castes like the Nadars. (4) Paradoxically in the preamble of the Indian Constitution, as well as in Article 25 (cf. its Forty-second Amendment (1976) where the word again appears), one finds an article on secularization and against caste discrimination. (5) After the bloody separation of India and Pakistan 1949, (6) when the “Saffron” parties broke with Congress in the 1960’s, Hinduism was exploited by extremists as a political capital. (7) In the 1980’s, especially in North India, one sees the rise of big caste so-called “peasant parties”, for instance in Bihar and Haryana the Yadav and the Jat-based political parties.

**Secularism as fundamentalism:** T.N. Madan shows (*Modern Myths, Locked Minds* 2009 ch.1) how an homogenizing, undifferentiated, secular citizenship was identified with the nation-state as part of the inheritance from the anti-colonial struggle. The Indian elite shared a “modernist” outlook and defined secular as the opposite of communalism. While for centuries caste had articulated Indian social morphology (Marc Galanter, 1963), secular ideology proposed modern economic and cultural security for “minorities”. But this security was too urgent and important to be left to the state alone; minorities wanted to defend their own rights. Then in the 1990’s the fundamentalist Hindu BJP’s presented their cultural nationalism as “secular”, i.e. protective of their own interests. Such fundamentalism conveyed value judgments, linking local identity and aspirations; the “power” of religion legitimized by modern secularity. Down-scaling security issues was in its own way logical.

This is what led Madan to say that Indian secularism, as promoted by the government since 1947 is ambiguous. It is not fully Western, not fully secular, since intertwined with the backlash of fundamentalism. Polarization of religion creates political capital separating out the true Hindu paraded under the fundamentalist banner of pluralism from the others. Another older Indian pluralism (*sarva dharma sambhava*) claimed to give equal respect for all religions, but this neutrality was translated in the modern Indian state into an “affirmative action” through the neutrality of the state towards the different religious communities But in fact three different conceptions are simultaneous circulating in India:

1- Mutual exclusivism, intolerance refusing to share social space.

2- “Rig-vedic” religious congruence: i.e. in the early twentieth century religious leaders like Vivekanada and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad identified the Muslim belief in the oneness of God (*tauhid*) with the non-dualistic (*advaita*) monotheism of Hinduism.

3- Mutual dependence, where each religion nurtures the others. Sri Ramakrishna, who lived as a Muslim for a while, respected the high Vedantic and the low Puranic folk traditions of Hinduism. However, uncritical affirmation of pluralism risks to be a naïve relativism, ie no values other than relativism itself.

In the first half of the twentieth century, Gandhi attempted to mobilize the hierarchy found in Hindu holistic thought for social action through a pluralistic orientation, on inter-group interdependence. Gandhi again and again refused to align himself with the untouchable leader’s Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar’s calls for separate *dalit* (untouchable) electoral roles which he believed would only separate them out further and confirm an inequalitarian coexistence. Nonetheless in the name of secularism, identity-based affirmative action was to become the key policy in the young Indian state’s program to deal with caste-based hierarchy.

**Hindu tradition becomes a religion:** T. N. Madan (2009, ch. 6), highlights the impact of British colonial administration’s influence on secularization. In the first British census in 1881, Brahmans were led to define the category of Hindu religion, essentialized as a social classification. While the British were initially puzzled by the notion of Hinduism as a religion, but to the Indians the need for postulating a Hindu community for anti-colonial political
mobilization in the 19th century became increasingly clear. Together with their role in the colonial administration, this launched a new form of Brahman hegemony. Initially “India” made sense to the extent that Hindu values envisaged the caste system as a social whole. When did this take shape? Hinduism is this-worldly but with a religious worldliness. “Hinduism” remained highly context-sensitive: philosophically as in the Vedic aphorism, “the truth is one, the sages call it by many names” (ekam sad viprah bahudâ vadanti), as well as socially, as witnessed by caste mobility.

The Indian anthropologist Srivinas stressed the institutional framework of religious tolerance provided by caste in Hindu society. What he meant by this is that while individual castes are exclusivist, the system as a whole accepts very different life styles because it accepts hierarchy. Internally each caste must observe norms (endogamy, an ascribed lifestyle in occupation, ritual status in a hierarchy, and cultural notions of purity and pollution). Such is the “price” for caste pluralism. While Indian secularism is “democratic spirituality”, the modern Hinduism has in part become a political ideology. Nehru acknowledge this as early as 1936 when he said, “The communal problem is not a religious problem, it has nothing to do with religion.” It concerns the exploitation of religion for secular ends of politicians. As Joel Robbins insists, an anthropology of morality is called for here where the normative behavior is permuted.

In the appendix to Secularism in its Place (1987), T. N. Madan proposes that modernity may be best analysed as both a practical necessity and a moral imperative, as a fact and a value, but that it need not be a break with tradition. This reinforces R. Bastin’s point in his article included in this volume. Economic growth, the inflation of rural land prices and full social mobility are breaking down earlier caste relations (Kapur, 2012) among local communities has led to the construction of new social segmentation. How can secular policy become a “shared credo of life” in South Asia, when many castes seek to defend their identity at the same time as they see themselves as part of a new rational and national whole. Is a “constitutional” polity permeated by caste a coherent one? The “modern” nation-state in India remains the social “myth” of an India unable to separate religion from politics. There is no fundamentalism in a traditional society. The rise of fundamentalism is due to the marginalization of religious faith by secularization that permits such a perversion of religion. Indian secularism tries to trivialize religious differences in the name of citizenship, but provides no further guidance for a viable political action. As in Buddhism (where the monk (bhikku) ranked higher than the king (chakkavatti)), Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism share a hierarchical view of the relation between the religious and the secular realms.

The values and the virtues of secularity have been widely debated in India since the 1980’s. The inseparability of religion and politics in India is motivated by a configuration clearly unfamiliar with the issue of the separation of church and state in Europe. The role of an autonomous ideology of secularism is ruled out by the likes of Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988): “Secularism destroys the sanctity and universality (transcendence) of all moral values (1982)” and religious

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43 - Louis Renou remarked (1953:46) “In India everything is in one sense older and in another sense of more recent origin than generally supposed.” Sub specie aeterni, dharma is a way of life. Heesterman notes (1963) that originally the roles of Brahman priest and king were interchangeable. Louis Dumont has famously demonstrated how the king depends on the priest (purohita) retaining only power but not hierarchical superiority. The function of the king is secularized, ie only relatively autonomous; kingship is everywhere present since permeated with cosmological power, which requires the brahman to sanction his authority. An autonomous political domain emerged within this framework but without reaching the level of a universal value. Even if Kautilya in his Arthasastra (Treatise on Wealth, c. 300 BC) tried to elevate artha above dharma. artha (wealth and its power) is opposed to dharma, but because of their hierarchical relation not fully separate from it.. The smriti texts (R. Lingat 1973:217) present the multiple roles of the purohita as the brain of the king for as the servant of dharma he is the servant of the state.
revivalism is to be avoided as intellectually bankrupt (1982:15). T.N. Madan says that the search for secular elements in the cultural traditions of India is futile. How could this be otherwise since secularism as an ideology emerged from the dialectic of modern science and Protestantism? Models of modernization transferred out of Europe necessarily involve full adaptation when imported to cultures with strong indigenous traditions. A downgrading of European values is inevitable. For Madan, each “peoples” must render their own historical experience meaningful. Borrowed ideas, unless internalized, grant, as Madan puts it, no “gift of the grace of living”. Rationalism cannot be considered the only motivation in creating a modern state. While secularism as an alien cultural ideology has failed to take hold in India, Hindu revivalism and Sikh fundamentalism have implicitly recognized it by reacting to an ideology which denies the public role of religion in society. Ashis Nandy(1985:17) states this clearly, “There is now a peculiar double-bind in Indian politics: the ills of religion have found political expression but the strengths of it have not been available for checking corruption and violence in public life.” The inscription on the wall of the Gol market cited above now seems to be wishful thinking.

Communalism is the reaction, the blowback, of a deeply “religious” society to a secularizing state’s interventions. Indian intellectuals like J.C. Bose (1853-1937) stressed the scientific content of Indian religious traditions. At the same time that the British colonialists were seeking to adopt the role of “transcendent” neutrality, after the 1857 Sepoy mutiny in order to camouflage their secularizing “modernity”, the Indians promoted “pluralism (dharma nirapekṣata) as a prominent trait of Indian civilization. Gandhi sometimes put this motto forward as an example of how religions flourish together if favored by non-violence and tolerance. Even as Indian secularism was emerging as an ideology out of the colonial experience, Gandhian reformers off their own bat campaigned not for the abolition of caste but for temple accessibility for all castes. Van der Veer writes (2011:280), “In India religion becomes the basis of resistance to the colonial state and it has to be reformed and modernized in order to make it part of the morality of the modern state.” There is no question as in China of destroying traditions but of reforming them. The great figures of the social margin in India like Ambedkar (an untouchable) and the Tamil leader Periyar, at the most burnt books, but never tore down temples. This clearly applies, although in a different manner, to the temptation for secularism to tap into the moral sources of religions to attempt to create the conditions for pluralism, a broader belonging, celebrated as citizenship in a decolonized India. It was clearly insufficient to re-baptize Gandhi’s Indian utopia of tolerance, as “secular”, for the same Hindu religiosity has continued on in the sixty years following Indian independence to create alternative modernity’s, models big and small for a moral state beyond secular control. By way of conclusion, here is one recent example of the persistence of Indian traditional cosmology in the solving of a modern ecological problem. This ecological activist has put forward in his person a cosmology that modernists would consider belongs to another age.

Prof. G.D. Agrawal (now better known as Swami Gyan Swaroop Sanand) by his fast to the death forced the cancellation of the Indian government project for three dams on the Ganges river in Uttarakand (Tehelka, 17 November, 2012, p. 23). These risked to dry up this river which since the 1840’s has been tapped for irrigation. In 2007 he visted Gangotri and was stunned that there was no water downstream in the Bhagirathi from the Maneri dam.In 2008 “…I decided to devote the rest of my life to Ganga ji. I don’t see Gangga ji as a river or an environmental issue, but as a divine power, my identity, my belief, my mother. I consider Bhagirath ji as my ancestor and the as his legacy.” One cannot accuse Dr.Agrawal of egomania for as he explains, “I was willing to let any big seer or dharmacarya do the fast instead of me. After all, it is their responsibility to protect

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44 - Bhagirathi river in West Bengal forms the western boundary of the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta. A distributary of theGanges (Ganga), until the 16th century, when the Ganges shifted eastward to the Padma, the Bhagirathi formed the original bed of the Ganges. Its banks sheltered the great ancient capitals of Bengal, and the river is held sacred by the Hindus. (Encyclopedia Britannica)
our culture. Unfortunately, sadhus and dharmacaryas with ashrams on the banks of Ganga ji just looked on as our mother was being plundered. I thought that if I died during the fast, it would force them to think why they too can’t die for Ganga ji.”

Conclusions: Religion inside and outside the secular state

Religion is cosmo-logical, a cosmo-graphic belief describing the world, passed on by shared tradition. Even when cosmological hierarchies are translated into anthropological hierarchies as in sixth century Christianity, they remain as templates of values (Headley, 2010). Most religious traditions continue to articulate the relation of the transcendent (adhi-atman in Sanskrit, literally “beyond self”) and the secular. If temporal power usurps this articulation, presenting another hierarchy, do religious traditions wither? Certainly temporarily, but only in appearance because the secularization of religious authority is limited to those dimensions of society which are most exposed: clergy, mosques, theological institutions, monasteries, etc. Since religious traditions are woven into the value system at every context and level, they can re-appear even when they seemed to have entirely disappeared elsewhere. In Russia where it proved impossible to separate religious and non-religious aspects of culture, communism became a religion which in turn was secularized leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia’s deep cultural identity was still marked the Byzantine tradition where the tsar adhered to that higher value, Christian revelation (Vibert, 2003).

In this essay several indicators chart the hierarchical alternation between intense secularization and the persistence of older hierarchies of value. The first of these is a shift to a mode of non-totalizing integration, pseudo holism, where a hierarchy of religious values under pressure from the state relinquishes its visibility, but not its potential for authority and certainly not its capacity for the transmission and a regeneration of spiritual authority through its ascetics.

In both Indonesia and India, democratic republican forms of government quickly turned into regimes for the distribution of privatized political power and wealth which prevented them from created a novel hierarchy of values. This constitutes a second indication of how evaluative indifference encouraged by state neutrality and religious pluralism may reinforce the earlier hierarchy of values which the state intended to marginalize. In Indonesia, the insistence by the Pancasila state ideology on the monotheism promoted by Muslims, ran counter to centuries of Javanese religious practice. Indeed throughout the Indonesian archipelago the diverse ethno-linguistic groups, once independence was acquired, were searching for an adequate experience of post-colonial “togetherness” (kelompakan) in their new republic (1949+). Two main themes crystallized in Indonesian sociology of the second half of the XXth century:

1) a cosmology weakened by the introduction of individualism.

2) the persistence of a sociability structured by religion, but where their praxis could be configured as incompatible.

And three antinomical features emerged out of this religious sociology:

1: Continued conversions to Islam were accompanied by a cultural resistance towards an “arabization” of Indonesian Islam.

2. Proselytism in Southeast Asia by both Christian denominations and Islamic groups created religious tension as well as mobilizing novel temporary alliances such as Muslims and Christians for mutual self-protection.

3. The purification and defense of local insular expressions of religiosity in Sumatra, Bali, Borneo, Aceh and generally throughout the immense archipelago.
The current apparent victory of Islam over Javanese animism is only the first phase preceding an eventual further synthesis of practice. Social competition for the control of the capital of prayer inside and outside of mosques/temples continues to be fed by the strength of popular piety.

In India a different configuration of secularization exists where Hindu traditions are reformulated as a different kind of fundamentalism from that of Indonesian Islam. Neither were a unique occurrence. When any tradition experiences sclerosis, and lose its spontaneous authority, it may turned into a political marker, pending revival with a renewed collective authenticity. Such a revival also occurred in Europe and the United states when Protestant Christianity was secularized and was superceded by evangelical/Pentecostal movements providing a near instantaneous charisma. The theologian Paul Tillich (1886-1965) esteemed that Protestantism had created a sacred void in Western society which itself led to the creation of demands for a secular reality. However Martin Marty’s distinguished secularism from secularization, ”self-contained, self-explanatory, self-enclosed”; since holistic, non-dualistic for the separation of the domains of secular and sacred in Christianity everywhere seeks to be acknowledged, whereas Islam in this past has sought to integrate their religious and civil ethos. Hinduism, as we have seen above, subsumes the secular under the sacred. So the rationalization Weber proposed, an ethical systemization, must be considered as an historical process is that is context specific and potentially only temporary.

One may criticize in Louis Dumont’s formulation of hierarchical oppositions for its structuralist dualism. Still empirically the appeal to a superior value that founds society not based on an abstract transcendence, but on one that is articulated by en-globing temporal authority in a “double” relationship functioning hierarchically. In India this was subverted as elsewhere outside of Western Europe. The comparative study of these morphologies show that pseudo-holism succeeds a fuller holism in the course of one or two generations. The authority of religious traditions in the “post-modern” era potentially transmits their age-old values with the authority they had known in the not so distant past. While re-enchantment or de-secularization as terms to describe this process are not analytical, still counter-secularization is definitely afoot. The pertinence of Dumont’s analytic vocabulary (value, hierarchy, inversion) to describe the on-going pertinence of hierarchies of current values through englobing, grasps better, not the revival, but the persistence of religious traditions.

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